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Saturday, November 7, 2009

The "Best Science"

I am sometimes asked, if animal experimentation is so heinous and dead-end, why does it keep getting funded?

In simple terms, we’re stupid.

Humans have the capacity to create complex systems that are too large and multifaceted for us to manage. UW-Madison vivisector and chair of the university’s Research Animal Resource Center, Eric Sangren, has used this plain fact as an excuse for the continuing problems associated with the university’s animal use. This inability to manage large complex organizations is akin to an economic diseconomy of scale.

We continue to receive information from within the university concerning Michele Basso. Basso has a long history of inept surgical implantation of hardware on the skulls of rhesus macaques. Veterinarians have repeatedly called attention to her clumsy ways, the unplanned deaths of the monkeys she tortures, and her pre-germ theory theories about cleaning surgical tools.

I write about Basso here because of a recent article in TheScientist.com titled “NIH Continues to Support the Best Science through R01s: A response to accusations that the agency is biased against senior scientists.” The NIH office of Extramural Research says R01s are “an award made to support a discrete, specified, circumscribed project to be performed by the named investigator(s) in an area representing the investigator's specific interest and competencies, based on the mission of the NIH.”

The notion in the article that R01s represent the “best science” caught my eye. I looked at Michele Basso’s currently funded cruelty and saw that she has an R01:

5R01EY013692-06 Principal Investigator(s): BASSO, MICHELE A
Title: VISUAL TARGET SELECTION FOR SACCADIC EYE MOVEMENTS
FY 2009: $359,754

Is this an example of the “best science”?

NIH grants are awarded when proposals receive high ratings from “Study Sections” made up of scientists working in the area that the research addresses. Turning decision-making over to small groups is like General Motors breaking its business into smaller units; giant complex enterprises do this in order to reduce the inefficiencies that come with diseconomies of scale.

This made me wonder about the Study Section that would have approved Basso’s cruelty. That Study Section is the Central Visual Processing Study Section, referred to as the CVP.

The CVP has seventeen members. There are eleven vivisectors (~65% of the committee) and six clinical researchers (~35% of the committee). It is small wonder that this Study Group would give high marks to vivisectors’ research. Of the eleven vivisectors, 1 uses cats, 1 uses frogs, 1 uses mice and ferrets, 1 uses rats, and 7 use monkeys

I’ve listed the members of the Study Group below and have included a citation of a representative paper if they use animals.

The fact that vivisectors are chosen to determine which studies will get funded, especially vivisectors like Basso who has such fumbling methods and pre-germ theory ideas, suggests that this so-called “best science” is really something else entirely.

CENTRAL VISUAL PROCESSING STUDY SECTION (CVP)
Center For Scientific Review
ROSTER

CHAIRPERSON

PARADISO, MICHAEL A.
BROWN UNIVERSITY
Macaque V1 activity during natural vision: effects of natural scenes and saccades.
MacEvoy SP, Hanks TD, Paradiso MA. J Neurophysiol. 2008

MEMBERS

ALONSO,JOSE-MANUEL
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
On and off domains of geniculate afferents in cat primary visual cortex.
Jin JZ, Weng C, Yeh CI, Gordon JA, Ruthazer ES, Stryker MP, Swadlow HA, Alonso JM. Nat Neurosci. 2008

BASSO, MICHELE A.
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

BORN, RICHARD T.
HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL
Integrating motion and depth via parallel pathways. [macaques]
Ponce CR, Lomber SG, Born RT. Nat Neurosci. 2008

BOYNTON, GEOFFREY M.
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
human

CALLAWAY, EDWARD M.
SALK INSTITUTE FOR BIOLOGICAL STUDIES
Parallel processing strategies of the primate visual system.
Nassi JJ, Callaway EM. Nat Rev Neurosci. 2009

CANDY, T. ROWAN
INDIANA UNIVERSITY
human

CHAPMAN, BARBARA
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Molecular correlates of laminar differences in the macaque dorsal lateral geniculate nucleus.
Murray KD, Rubin CM, Jones EG, Chalupa LM. J Neurosci. 2008

COHEN-CORY, SUSANA
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE
Netrin participates in the development of retinotectal synaptic connectivity by modulating axon arborization and synapse formation in the developing brain. [Xenopus]
Manitt C, Nikolakopoulou AM, Almario DR, Nguyen SA, Cohen-Cory S. J Neurosci. 2009

CULLEN, KATHLEEN E.
MCGILL UNIVERSITY
Different neural strategies for multimodal integration: comparison of two macaque monkey species. Sadeghi SG, Mitchell DE, Cullen KE. Exp Brain Res. 2009

DEANGELIS, GREGORY C.
UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER
Fine discrimination training alters the causal contribution of macaque area MT to depth perception.
Chowdhury SA, DeAngelis GC. Neuron. 2008

GUIDO, WILLIAM
VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY
Ablation of Ca2+ channel beta3 subunit leads to enhanced N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor-dependent long term potentiation and improved long term memory. [mice]
Jeon D, Song I, Guido W, Kim K, Kim E, Oh U, Shin HS. J Biol Chem. 2008

KASTNER, SABINE
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
human

KIRKWOOD, ALFREDO
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Neuromodulators control the polarity of spike-timing-dependent synaptic plasticity. [rats]
Seol GH, Ziburkus J, Huang S, Song L, Kim IT, Takamiya K, Huganir RL, Lee HK, Kirkwood A. Neuron. 2007

LEIGH, RICHARD J.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY
human

WATANABE, TAKEO
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
human

WERNER, JOHN S.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS
human

Monday, November 2, 2009

Learned Helplessness. Inescapable Electrical Shock

Adapted from a chapter in Monsters and Pygmies


I began researching Martin Seligman’s experiments on dogs in 2003 for a (unpublished) book I was working on. While working on Monsters and Pygmies, I happened upon a statement by Dr. Seligman in The Daily Pennsylvanian (“the University of Pennsylvania's independent student newspaper”) from 2008.

He sums up his position:
Forty years ago, several dozen dogs got 64 brief shocks that were moderately painful. From the knowledge that was gained, depression was relieved for hundreds of thousands of people. Inflicting pain on animals or humans in medical experiments can only be justified if it is likely that the knowledge gained will eliminate vastly more suffering.

This is what I believed then, and what I still believe today. (Martin Seligman. Opinion: “Data that opens countless doors” (Counterpoint). The Daily Pennsylvanian. August 7, 2008.
“[S]everal dozen dogs got 64 brief shocks that were moderately painful.” What’s the big deal?

The cold, unflinching repetition of torture is a hallmark of a monster.

Several dozen dogs. More than a dozen dozen, actually. Treating even one dog the way Seligman did would be monstrous.

“64 brief shocks that were moderately painful.” What’s the big deal?

Seligman reported that his observations were based on over 150 dogs.
When an experimentally naive dog receives escape-avoidance training in a shuttle box, the following behavior typically occurs: at the onset of the first traumatic electric shock, the dog runs frantically about, defecating, urinating and howling, until it accidentally scrambles over the barrier and so escapes the shock. On the next trial, the dog, running and howling, crosses the barrier more quickly than on the preceding trial. This pattern continues until the dog learns to avoid shock altogether. Overmier and Seligman (1967) and Seligman and Maier (1967) found a striking difference between this pattern of behavior and that exhibited by dogs first given inescapable electric shocks in a Pavlovian hammock. Such a dog’s first reactions to shock in the shuttle box are much the same as those of a naive dog. In dramatic contrast to a naive dog, however, a typical dog which has experienced uncontrollable shocks before avoidance training soon stops running and howling and sits or lies, quietly whining, until shock terminates. The dog does not cross the barrier and escape from shock. Rather, it seems to give up and passively accepts the shock. On succeeding trials, the dog continues to fail to make escape movements and takes as much shock as the experimenter chooses to give. (Seligman, M.E. “Depression and Learned Helplessness.” In (R.J Friedmand and M.M. Katz Eds.) The Psychology of Depression: Contemporary Theory and Research. Washington D.C.: V.H. Winston and Sons, 1974.
Now, Seligman in the The Daily Pennsylvanian, quoted below, should be read with some skepticism, because “this brings us to an obvious but mostly overlooked weakness in the vivisector's position: that is, his inevitable forfeiture of all claim to have his word believed. It is hardly to be expected that a man who does not hesitate to vivisect for the sake of science will hesitate to lie about it afterwards to protect it from what he deems the ignorant sentimentality of the laity.” (The Doctor's Dilemma, Getting Married, and The Shewing-up of Blanco. George Bernard Shaw. 1911.)
I arrived at Penn as a graduate student in psychology in 1964, when Richard Solomon's laboratory was doing experiments with electric shocks and dogs. Dogs that received 64 brief inescapable shocks became passive, and this seemed to me a likely model of human helplessness and depression.
So we have to understand Seligman from the position of someone who willingly entered and became part of a vivisectionist’s lab. He wasn’t ordered to do it, like a Nazi soldier or a U.S. reservist at Abu Ghraib, people who were simply easily led, he apparently sought out Solomon’s lab.
As excited as I was by the possibilities of this discovery, I was dejected about something else.

Could I work in a laboratory that gave shocks to perfectly innocent animals? I have always been an animal lover, particularly a dog lover, so the prospect of causing pain - if only minor and temporary pain - was very distasteful. I shared my doubts with one of my philosophy teachers (who went on to become one of the world's leading philosophers), Robert Nozick.
Minor and temporary, he says. But this was written after the fact. He had already explained forty years earlier that: “at the onset of the first traumatic electric shock, the dog runs frantically about, defecating, urinating and howling,” and that “On succeeding trials, the dog continues to fail to make escape movements and takes as much shock as the experimenter chooses to give.”

“I've seen something in the lab that might be the beginning of understanding helplessness,” I started out. “No one has ever investigated helplessness before, yet I'm not sure I can pursue it, because I don't think it's right to give shocks to dogs. Even if it's not wrong, it's repulsive.”

“Marty,” Bob asked, “do you have any other way of cracking the problem of helplessness?” It was clear to both of us that case histories of patients were a scientific dead end. It was equally clear that only well controlled experiments could isolate cause and discover cure. Further, there was no way I could ethically give shock to human beings. This seemed to leave only experiments with animals.

“Is it ever justified,” I asked, “to inflict pain on any creature?” Bob reminded me that most human beings, as well as household pets, are alive today because animal experiments were carried out. Without them, he asserted, polio would still be rampant and smallpox widespread.

“Let me ask you one thing about what you propose to do,” Bob said finally. “Is there a substantial chance that you will eliminate much more pain in the long run than the pain you cause in the short run?”

My answer was “yes.”
Maybe Seligman remembers this more-than-four-decade-old conversation accurately, but one has to wonder given the fact that Robert Nozick is remembered for his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia, in which he argues at length that ethical treatment of animals isn’t adequately defined by such utilitarianism. Nozick writes:
[I]sn’t utilitarianism at least adequate for animals? I think not. But if not only the animals’ felt experiences are relevant, what else is? Here a tangle of questions arises. How much does an animal's life have to be respected once it’s alive, and how can we decide this? Must one also introduce some notion of a nondegraded existence? Would it be all right to use genetic-engineering tech­niques to breed natural slaves who would be contented with their lots? Natural animal slaves? Was that the domestication of ani­mals? Even for animals, utilitarianism won't do as the whole story, but the thicket of questions daunts us. (Robert Nozick. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974.
Unfortunately, Robert Nozick died in 2002, so we can’t ask him.

Robert Seligman, on the other hand is alive and well. His current shtick is the promotion of happiness; go figure.

This is from the University of Pennsylvania website:
Dr. Martin Seligman is the Director of the University of Pennsylvania Positive Psychology Center and founder of Positive Psychology, a new branch of psychology which focuses on the empirical study of such things as positive emotions, strengths-based character, and healthy institutions. His research has demonstrated that it is possible to be happier — to feel more satisfied, to be more engaged with life, find more meaning, have higher hopes, and probably even laugh and smile more, regardless of one’s circumstances. Positive psychology interventions can also lastingly decrease depression symptoms. The research underlying these rigorously tested interventions is presented in the July/August edition of the American Psychologist, the journal of the American Psychology Association.

Authentic Happiness has almost 700,000 registered users around the world.
Maybe Seligman has turned over a new leaf. Let’s hope so. But he hasn’t come close to apologizing for the things he has done or the lives he destroyed (from The Daily Pennsylvanian):
From the knowledge that was gained, depression was relieved for hundreds of thousands of people. [Actual improvement of symptoms is almost entirely due to a serendipitous discovery that resulted from the treatment of tuberculosis in the early 1950s. The resulting pharmacological revolution had no connection to Seligman’s experiments.] Inflicting pain on animals or humans in medical experiments can only be justified if it is likely that the knowledge gained will eliminate vastly more suffering.

This is what I believed then, and what I still believe today.
But what he did was monstrous.
[I]t is not an accident that we have used the word “helplessness” to describe the behavior of dogs in our laboratory. Animals that lie down in traumatic shock that could be removed simply by jumping to the other side, and who fail even to make escape movements are readily seen as helpless. Moreover we should not forget that depressed patients commonly describe themselves helpless, hopeless, and powerless. (Seligman, M.E. “Depression and Learned Helplessness.”)
And even if what he did was monstrous, he did it 40 years ago, right? So what’s the big deal? Yet others, who have been accused of arguably lesser crimes from 60 years ago, are being brought to justice. A March 2009, Associated Press story (Nazi war crimes suspect loses extradition appeal) reported that: “Charles Zentai is accused of beating to death teenager Peter Balazs in 1944 in Budapest while serving as a soldier in the army of his native Hungary, then allied with Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany.”

Beating a teenager to death is certainly a serious crime, but it has to be evaluated in light of Stanley Milgram’s famous discovery that the weight of authority is too often sufficient to compel us to hurt others. In a letter dated 1961, Milgram wrote to Henry Riecken, head of Social Sciences at the National Science Foundation:
The results are terrifying and depressing. They suggest that human nature—or more specifically, the kind of character produced in American society—cannot be counted on to insulate its citizens from brutality and inhumane treatment at the direction of a malevolent authority. In a naïve moment some time ago, I wondered whether in all of the United States a vicious government could find enough moral imbeciles to meet the personnel requirements of a system of death camps, of the sort that were maintained in Germany. I am now beginning to think that the full compliment could be recruited in New Haven. A substantial proportion of people do what they are told to do, irrespective of the content of the act, and without pangs of conscious, so long as they perceive that the command comes from a legitimate authority. (Thomas Blass. The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram. New York: Basic Books, 2004.)
Charles Zentai may be guilty of being swept up in the Nazi frenzy and following orders and as a result committing what is now viewed as a crime, but this is much different than simply heading out on his own and beating people to death. There is a fundamental difference between a "moral imbecile," as most of are wont to be at times, and monsters, who proceed independently, without outside direction to torture and murder others.

If Zentai should be held to account for killing one boy, while perhaps following orders to do so, then so too must someone who tortured 150 dogs and other animals so severely.

We can’t leave Seligman without thinking about his recollected conversation with Robert Nozick. Seligman claims to recall that Nozick said that “most human beings, as well as household pets, are alive today because animal experiments were carried out. Without them, polio would still be rampant and smallpox widespread.” But this is pure unadulterated bunk; how handy it would be if it were correct.

All epidemic diseases ebb and flow. Whether or not polio ebbed because of polio vaccinations is not as clear as it might seem. Polio wasn’t ever really "rampant." Heart disease and cancer account for over 40% of the deaths that occur in the U.S. In 1952, at the peak of the polio epidemic in the U.S., 3,145 died from complications related to the disease. This is a lot of people, but polio doesn’t even make the 1952 (or any other year's) top ten list of the leading causes of death.26 Polio was hyped only because President Roosevelt had the disease. [See: “Leading Causes of Death, 1900-1998.” Centers for Disease Control. And David M. Oshinsky. Polio: An American Story. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.] Polio research got funded while the real killers were left largely ignored. Most human beings are not alive today because animal experiments were carried out during the development of the polio vaccine. Seligman is wrong.

How about smallpox? A readable and informative book on the topic is Jennifer Lee Carole’s 2003 novelized science history, The Speckled Monster: A Historical Tale of Battling Smallpox (New York: Plume, 2003.) In short, a British woman who had herself survived smallpox, as most people did, accompanied her husband to his post as the British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. In Turkey, she learned of the practice of inoculation against small pox. She carried the practice home with her to England where it was tried and written about, which led to its introduction in America.

Edward Jenner, credited with the invention of vaccination, had himself been inoculated against smallpox the old fashioned way, with a small bit of the pus from a smallpox lesion being placed into a small intentional wound. This practice, called variolation, was becoming fairly widespread and accepted by the time Jenner began trying vaccination as a safer less-stressful alternative.

Moreover, Jenner didn’t conduct animal experiments. He wondered why milkmaids didn’t seem to be as susceptible to small pox as other people. He had been inoculating people with pus from lesions on smallpox victims, but tried using pus from lesions on the hands of a milkmaid. The people he tried the new procedure on were his experimental subjects.

Any claim that “animal experimentation” led to the small pox vaccination is woefully uninformed or intentionally misleading. Seligman is wrong again. Monsters dearly want people to accept as “a necessary evil” the tortures they visit on their victims. They can’t be trusted. They can’t be believed.

Our fear is special?

A few days ago, I posted a conversation between Richard Dawkins, the well-known bulldog of Darwinian evolution and Peter Singer, arguably the father of the modern animal rights movement. As I said then, it’s well worth listening to.

I want to comment on a couple of the things that were said. I will specify the time in the video where the section begins, but for some reason the counter seems glitchy, so I don’t promise that 3:55 is exactly 3:55 on your machine.

In any case, at approximately 3:55 Dawkins asks Singer what he thinks is special about humans – voicing the caveat that there are special things about every species.

Singer says that humans have a "biographical" life. That is, we, and only humans, have a sense or knowledge of our past and our possible future. Only humans have the capacity to plan their lives. Dawkins says that because other animals don’t think about their future, that killing them is “less bad” than killing humans – animals who do have a sense of their own future.

One of the irksome things about this conversation is that neither participant seems well informed. In the case of humans, we can ask, “Why are you doing that?” and can get an answer, “I’m storing food for the winter months ahead.” But many rodents and a number of birds who live in climates with hard winters store food.

Another case of thinking ahead is the story told by Jane Goodall about Mike, who discovered that the banging caused by pushing empty kerosene cans in front of him during his charging displays frightened the other chimpanzees. Goodall writes, “[I]t seemed that Mike actually planned his charging displays; almost, one might say in cold blood. Often when he got up to fetch his cans he showed no visible signs of frustration or excitement; that came afterward when, armed with his display props, he began to rock from side to side, raise his hair, and hoot.” [Emphasis in the original.](In the Shadow of Man. 1971. Houghton Mifflin. Paperback. p 114.)

There are many other examples of animals planning ahead. This is seen in wolves’ and dolphins’ cooperative hunting.

On a more mundane note, Millie, an old Chihuahua mix-breed dog who lived with us up until the time of her death, clearly remembered street food that she had found the day before that she had not been allowed to eat. On our walk the next day, she led us back to it, and if I was daydreaming, she would gobble it quickly before I realized that she had it again.

It’s hard to say whether or not Millie or Mike thought about what they would do the next day as they drifted off to sleep, but they behaved as if they did. This apparent similar look into the future means that we aren’t the only beings with a sense of a possible future and who might plan ahead to make it a future we prefer. Likewise, many animals remember things that occurred to them in the past, and in the obvious cases, avoid dangers they had encountered or, like Millie, use past knowledge to plan ahead.

We simply can’t know at this time whether other animals have thoughts about their long-term futures. Unfortunately, in the absence of this knowledge, both Singer and Dawkins are content to act as if our absence of knowledge is proof of absence.

Dawkins claims, and isn’t challenged by Singer, on his claim that killing someone (another animal) who doesn’t have our sense of the future is “less bad” than killing those of us who do have this awareness of the future.

This isn’t so clear.

One of the common themes of spiritualism (I don’t mean this in a pejorative sense) is mindfulness, of being here now, of being in the present moment and not thinking about what you need to do. The idea is that such experiential immediacy is a more authentic more spiritual mode of being. If killing someone is “less bad” when they have no thoughts of their potential future, then killing a spiritual person while they are in such a meditative state would be “less bad’ than killing someone who is plotting their future financial wealth.

Extending this idea, it would mean that it would be "less bad" to kill a poor destitute young child from the Third World than it would be to kill an affluent adult in, say, Madison Wisconsin.

At approximately 7:35, Dawkins and Singer more or less come to the consensus that oysters have rudimentary nervous systems which they feel means that they don’t feel pain like we (or other vertebrates do) and thus don’t matter too much. Singer seems to joke that people who eat oysters could still think of themselves as vegetarians or vegans.

Once again, their speculations are far from being fact-based. Singer seems to hang his concerns neatly on the vertebrates and Dawkins seems happy to go along with him. In fact, the vertebrate/invertebrate physiological difference doesn’t mean too awfully much. Oysters are mollusks. A relative, the scallop, is a highly alert and active being. Check out this short video of captive scollops.

Other mollusks, namely the octopi, squid, and cuttlefish, behave in complex ways. The intelligence of the octopi is more or less well-known.



Dawkins picks up again on this theme at approximately 9:45.

Paraphrasing, he says that our moral responsibility to an oyster is quantitatively less than our moral responsibility to a pig and that our moral responsibility to a pig is quantitatively less than our moral responsibility to a human for the reasons mentioned by Singer, to wit, that invertebrates don’t feel much pain and that humans have a "biographical" life.

But Singer’s position is based on simple and apparently only shallow conjecture. His belief that invertebrates must not be as sensitive to pain as he is has a familiar and arrogant ring to it. It was accepted as fact not long ago that blacks were similarly less sensitive to pain and misery than whites.

Later, at around 10:20, Dawkins says that the only justification of eating meat lies in the differences in animals' abilities to see what’s coming, the ability to feel fear, the ability to be bereaved, “and things like that.”

Singer lets this comment pass and politely takes Dawkins to task when he says that he doesn’t know too much about the way animals are raised on factory farms or slaughtered.

Individuals of many animal species have the ability to see and to guess what is and might be coming. Otherwise, rabbits wouldn’t run from predators. But most astounding and disturbing is Dawkin’s comment about fear. Apparently, he feels that other animals don’t feel fear like we do, and Singer let the statement go unchallenged.

Dawkin’s apparent belief is wildly inaccurate and profoundly ignorant. Fear may be the most widely shared of all emotions. Dawkins should review Seligman’s learned helplessness experiments with dogs, which I comment on here.

Saturday, October 31, 2009

Payola. Kickback. Graft.

Call it what you want, but by any name it’s seedy and corrupt.

In 1997/98 when the University of Wisconsin, Madisons’s NIH primate center acting-director Joseph Kemnitz successfully disposed of the Vilas monkeys and destroyed the monkey house, thereby reducing the likelihood of the public remembering the UW primate center’s and NIH’s apparent collusion to get rid of the monkeys the university had promised not to torture, but did, he was rewarded with the Primate Center Directorship. Insiders felt he was incompetent and not up to the job, but his success at sweeping the scandal under the rug and out of sight seems to have been more important to those in power than good science or administrative acumen.

When the university learned that a public education center was going to be installed next door to the primate center, they pressured the property owner, Roger Charly (that's him in front of one of his stores) owner of Budget Bicycle and Machinery Row Bicycles, to break his contract with us. The law firm they turned to for help was Foley & Lardner.

We will probably never know for sure, but it is interesting to wonder just how nervous NIH was over the possibility of its primate experimentation program being nationally showcased. One potential measure of NIH’s gratitude for Foley & Lardner’s services is the recently announced $208 million NIH contract they were just awarded.

Saturday, October 24, 2009

"No real accountability."

First, read this (and note the multiple mutilations of the poor mouse's ear.): UW-Madison seeks better supervision of research. Deborah Ziff | 608-252-6234 | dziff@madison.com | October 23, 2009


I attended the "town hall meeting" mentioned at the end of the article and came away with some interesting impressions.

1. The meeting was held in the Humanities building; most of the attendees apparently, from their comments, were from the humanities and non-biological sciences. I was struck by how uninterested in the university’s problems the audience seemed to be. I don't think they know what the problems are; their questions were uniformly: "How will the restructuring affect me, my ability to get funding, my program?" Me, me, me.

They seemed to have no idea or knowledge that the university is being investigated for NIH Major Action violations, violations of its Public Health Service Assurance, or that the university fears loss of its AAALAC accreditation. (Association for Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care.) They didn't seem to understand or care about the reasons that the administration is alarmed. They didn't seem to understand that UW administration's conversation with people in the humanities was more or less done for the sake of appearance. Even a statement by Provost Paul DeLuca that federal funding -- somewhere in the neighborhood of $1 billion a year -- is at risk because of the university's failed oversight of its scientists' use of animals and infectious disease research didn't seem to really sink in with this crowd.

When English professors and historians sit quietly by as the university violates regulation after regulation involving its animal care and use we don't have to think too deeply or for very long to understand how and why past atrocities were allowed to occur without comment from within.

2. DeLuca said that the point of the restructuring was to make issues regarding compliance with animal care and use and biosafety “not on the table for discussion any more.” He said that by having a new position at the top – someone who would be "responsible" for all the problems currently plaguing the university’s billion-dollar enterprise – would solve all these problems.

3. Chancellor Biddy Martin said that there had been “a number of near misses” and that the university can not make assurances to federal agencies right now that it is in compliance with federal regulations concerning animal care and biosafety.

4. She said that there have been only 2 or 3 biosafety personnel trying to keep tabs on 200-300 projects.

5. Chancellor Martin also said that the restructuring is needed because right now, and for a long time apparently, there has been “no real accountability” for failures in the oversight of animal care and biosafety.

The take home message from the meeting is that past assurances from the university that there is good and stringent oversight of its animal care and use and of the safety of its infectious disease labs, has been pure and unadulterated public relations crap. Chancellor Biddy Martin and Provost Paul DeLuca as much as admitted this and used it as an excuse for the restructuring they intend to put in place.

The main change they want to make is the establishment of a permanent lobbying office in Washington D.C. It appears from their statements at the meeting that the substance of the problem – the twisted culture that allows animals to be starved, experimented on without observation, cut into without expertise, that allows diseases to be genetically modified to be more dangerous – is of little real concern. The main issue to them is the possible loss of funding and the opportunity to lobby for more taxpayer dollars.

It’s a corrupt and sick system from top to bottom.

For the idiot who doesn't know who I am.

An anonymous (how very brave) comment recently claimed that I hide my true identity on this blog. It's true that I don't paste my name in neon on everything I am involved with, but anyone other than a complete idiot with an interest in knowing who I am will find it easy to discern.

You can watch me rant on TV here.

Friday, October 23, 2009

Tradition and Delight

Mostly, we don’t think too deeply about the things we do. We do them for various reasons. Tradition and fashion, though apparently and sometimes genuinely in conflict, are common motivators for our behaviors and actions.

We paint the house in subdued colors if the other houses on the street are painted in subdued colors. We wear clothes similar to the clothes others are wearing, style our hair similarly, and eat similar foods. We sometimes, sometimes habitually, choose to do things that make us feel good, like eating a favorite food.

Seldom do we do these things with much introspection or questioning.

People eat animals for two reasons. Eating them is a tradition, and we have developed a taste for their flesh and secretions. These are relatively trivial reasons when weighed against the suffering inherent in animal agriculture.

Usually, when people pause to consider this equation they come up with a few other possible reasons for eating animals, but none of them have much weight unless, perhaps, one is an Inuit or a Kalahari bushman with no access to grocery stores. For most people, tradition and gustatory delight are adequate reasons to keep eating them.

If the suffering inherent in eating beef, pork, poultry, and fish is justified with such trivialities then no real consideration of other uses of animals seems possible. This explains why the vivisector with the monkey strapped into the chair is so confused by the public’s complaints and concerns. If tradition and flavor are believed to be reason enough to keep animals in miserable conditions and to treat them poorly and kill them, then surely they can be sacrificed on the alter of scientific knowledge without qualm.

If you sit in the stands and eat a hotdog, how could you care about a terrified calf being roped around the neck and slammed to the ground?

Discussions about animal use in science and entertainment are hard to have with people who believe their tasty fat is reason enough to make their lives hell.

Alzheimer's Disease

chicagotribune.com
Leading Alzheimer's researcher: Animal experiments will not help humans
MCT News Service
October 23, 2009

The Society for Neuroscience just held its annual conference in Chicago.

I attended _ not as a member, though neuroscience is my field, but to protest the organization's stated goal of broadening support for animal research. The society, like animal experimenters everywhere, perceives "growing threats" to animal research and seeks to recruit additional allies with a "vested interest" in promoting animal experimentation.

Every vested interest is entitled to its own propaganda, but such an effort warrants a response from neuroscience researchers who instead advocate kindness to animals.

Neuroscientists with established research credentials and a PETA membership are rare. They are often viewed by faculty colleagues as untrustworthy or even treasonous agents provocateurs as they are inclined to raise both scientific and ethical objections to the most egregious abuses of animals within our own universities. Yet medical school faculty members who are also animal activists are uniquely well-qualified to expose basic scientists' disingenuous, misleading or overreaching claims their animal research is scientifically and ethically justified because the results may someday, somehow, possibly benefit humans.

Contrived connections between cruelty-intensive basic neuroscience research and future human welfare is a tacit admission by neuroscientists the general public, which ultimately funds most research, would recoil in horror from their more grotesque monkey, dog or cat experiments and overwhelmingly condemn them if they knew they were not going to help humans.

One particularly egregious example is a decades-long series of highly invasive monkey experiments performed at universities across the country to study neural control of visual tracking. Luckless monkeys have coils implanted in both eyes, multiple craniotomies for electrode placements in their brains and head immobilization surgeries in which screws, bolts and plates are directly attached to their skulls. This is followed by water deprivation to produce a "work ethic" so they will visually track moving objects.

First impressions are usually correct in questions of cruelty to animals, and most of us cannot even bear to look at pictures of these monkeys with their electrode-implanted brains and bolted heads being put through their paces in a desperate attempt to get a life-sustaining sip of water.

Such cruelty is justified in the corresponding grant application by invoking the possibility the resulting data may allow us to find the cause and cure for diseases such as Alzheimer's. But we who have spent decades in Alzheimer's disease research recognize such a blank-check justification is an ethical bait-and-switch since this neural pathway is not even involved in Alzheimer's disease and these experiments have never been referenced in real Alzheimer's disease research.

Because such monkey torture will not lead to improved human health, you don't need to be an animal rights advocate to wonder if an ethical cost-benefit analysis might conclude the ends just don't justify the means, especially since rapid advances in sophisticated high-resolution neuroimaging on humans will very soon obviate the need for such invasive techniques.

Because grant money comes with animal research, the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees mandated by the Animal Welfare Act to prevent excessive cruelty have been rendered largely ineffectual, as their membership is stacked predominantly with animal researchers.

Most animal experiments on monkeys, dogs, cats and other animals are not related to human benefit, and describing such research as "humane" requires an Orwellian-newspeak definition of the word. "Humane" means to treat with kindness, consideration or mercy, and as long as words have meanings that cannot be twisted Humpty Dumpty-like into whatever we want them to mean, animal experimentation is not and can never be humane.

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Lawrence A. Hansen, M.D., is a board-certified pathologist and neuropathologist and a professor of neuroscience and pathology at the University of California-San Diego, where he also leads the neuropathology core of the Alzheimer Disease Research Center. In March 2009, he was recognized by the Journal of Alzheimer's Disease as one of the top 100 Alzheimer's disease investigators in the world. Dr. Hansen may be reached c/o People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 501 Front St., Norfolk, VA 23510; www.PETA.org.